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INTRODUCTION
The law in all states presumes that a husband is the father of his wife’s
children and gives him the status of the children’s legal father.1 In sixteen
states, same-sex couples can marry or enter civil unions or domestic
partnerships that give the parties all or almost all the benefits of marriage
under state law, including the presumption that the spouse/partner of a legal
parent is presumed to be the legal parent of a child born into the
relationship.2 The status of legal parent provides crucial protections to the
*
Dorothy Kliks Fones Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. Thanks to the
other participants in the New Illegitimacy Conference for their feedback and ideas, and
particularly thanks to Nancy Polikoff for her insightful questions and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105 (West 2011) (“A man is
presumed to be the natural father of a child if: (a) He and the child’s natural mother are
or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage . . . .”);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5 (West 2011) (“A man is presumed to be the natural
father of a child if: (1) he and the child’s natural mother are or have been married to
each other . . . and the child is born or conceived during such marriage . . . .”).
2. As of July 2011, seven jurisdictions issued marriage licenses to same-sex
couples (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York and
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adults and children in a parent-child relationship.3 For example, adults who
consider themselves parents but who are not legally recognized as such are
not obliged to support the child and are not entitled to see the child if the
child’s legal parent objects. If a child’s legal parent dies or becomes
unable to care for the child, there is no guarantee that an adult who had
acted as parent but who did not establish legal parentage will be allowed to
continue living with, or even see, the child.4
While marriage before a child is born automatically brings legal

the District of Columbia), and nine additional states allowed couples to enter civil
unions or domestic partnerships that provide all or nearly all the rights of marriage
under state law (California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, Nevada,
Rhode Island, and Washington). Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
Partnerships,
NAT’L
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (last updated July 14, 2011). In 2012
Hawaii will join this group. Id. For a discussion of the parental rights of nonbiological
parties to Vermont civil unions, see Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt.
2006).
3. A number of the decisions holding that state constitutions require the extension
of the rights of marriage to same-sex couples discuss the importance of the legal
recognition of the parents’ relationship to the well-being of the children, since this
recognition brings with it protection for parent-child relationships as well. For
example, in Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, the court said:
Where a married couple has children, their children are also directly or
indirectly, but no less auspiciously, the recipients of the special legal and
economic protections obtained by civil marriage. Notwithstanding the
Commonwealth’s strong public policy to abolish legal distinctions between
marital and nonmarital children in providing for the support and care of
minors, the fact remains that marital children reap a measure of family stability
and economic security based on their parents’ legally privileged status that is
largely inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to nonmarital children. Some
of these benefits are social, such as the enhanced approval that still attends the
status of being a marital child. Others are material, such as the greater ease of
access to family-based State and Federal benefits that attend the presumptions
of one’s parentage. (citations omitted).
798 N.E.2d 941, 956 (Mass. 2003); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401
(Cal. 2008) (excluding same-sex couples from marriage violates equal protection to
adults and harms children); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 474-75
(Conn. 2008) (noting that exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage has an
especially deleterious effect on children); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217-31 (N.J.
2006) (recognizing that although the constitution does not require that same-sex
couples be allowed to marry, they must be able to enter a relationship that provides the
benefits of marriage, discussing the adverse effect on children if parents cannot marry).
4. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972). Although Peter Stanley,
the unmarried father, had lived intermittently with his children and their mother for
many years, when she died, because he was never married to the mother, Illinois law
did not recognize him as a legal father, and his children were taken into state custody as
orphans. Id.
Lack of a legally-recognized relationship between the adult and the child can
mean that they are ineligible for family-based public assistance and other benefits. See
M.F. v. Dept. Human Servs., 928 A.2d 71, 84-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
(denying Temporary Assistance to Needy Families benefits to a lesbian coparent and
child after the death of the child’s biological mother because of lack of legal
relationship between the coparent and child).
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parenthood to both adults, if an unmarried woman has a baby, only she is
automatically the child’s legal parent. Unmarried couples5 must take
additional steps to confer legal fatherhood on the man. Traditionally, an
unmarried father became a legal parent only by later marrying the mother
or because of a judgment concluding a paternity suit.6 Today, however, in
all states, opposite-sex couples who cannot or do not wish to marry can
establish the man as a child’s legal father by signing a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity (VAP) and filing it with the state vital
statistics office.7 Voluntary acknowledgments have become the most
common way to establish the legal paternity of children born outside
marriage. In 2009, 1,693,850 children were born outside marriage.8 In the
same year, paternity was established by a VAP for 1,167,000 children,
compared to 643,000 cases in which paternity was established by

5. At least two North American courts have recognized three people as a child’s
legal parents for all purposes. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2007) (awarding custody, and joining the third parent as an indispensable party); A.A.
v. B.B. (2007), 83 O.R. 3d 561, para. 37 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (upholding an order
recognizing three adults as legal parents of a child, where all three adults agreed to the
arrangement); see also Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 855 (La. 1989) (recognizing dual
paternity for purposes of child support duties); Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192, 1197
(La. App. 1995) (recognizing dual paternity for purposes of custody and visitation).
For a discussion of the Louisiana law, see Katherine Shaw Spaht, Who’s Your Momma,
Who Are Your Daddies? Louisiana’s New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 307 (2007).
This Article only discusses legal protections for couples who want to raise
children together, since recognizing more than two parents brings new practical and
legal issues not discussed herein. For arguments in favor of legal regimes that allow
more than two legal parents, see, for example, Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s
Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third Social Parent in Same-Sex
Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171 (2008); Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by
the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2008); Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and
the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649 (2008); Katharine T. Barlett,
Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When
the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); Nancy E.
Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231 (2007); Leslie Joan
Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461
(1996); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights
and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 209 (2007);
Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47 (2007); Nancy
D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J.
459 (1990); Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the
Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 518 (1998).
6. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *457 (discussing the treatment of
nonmarital children at eighteenth century English common law); MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
198-233 (1985) (discussing parental law in nineteenth century America).
7. For a more detailed discussion of voluntary acknowledgments, see infra
Section II.
8. BRADY E. HAMILTON ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., BIRTHS:
PRELIMINARY
DATA
FOR
2009
(2010),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_03.pdf.
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adjudicative processes.9
In contrast, same-sex couples who cannot or do not want to marry but
who would like to be legal parents together do not have a cheap, simple
way of achieving this goal. All unmarried parents, including same-sex
couples, need to be able to identify themselves as being in a family with
their children and to claim the protections of legal parentage for themselves
and their children, even though the unmarried parents are not making the
commitment to each other that marriage entails. This Article proposes
recasting the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity as a voluntary
acknowledgement of parentage, available to all unmarried couples, samesex as well as opposite-sex.
Same-sex couples do have ways of establishing both partners as legal
parents, at least in some states. The first section of this Article describes
these legal devices and explains why they are inadequate for protecting
same-sex couples and their children. The second part of this Article
describes voluntary acknowledgments of paternity in some detail and how
opposite-sex couples use them. Then, this Article argues that voluntary
acknowledgments or their legal equivalent should be made available to
same-sex couples as well. This part of the Article includes an analysis of
possible arguments against my position and my responses. The last section
details a proposed set of statutes that would create the equivalent of
voluntary acknowledgments for same-sex parents, appropriately adapted to
fit the specifics of their situation.10
I. LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR ADULT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS WHERE THE
ADULT IS NOT THE CHILD’S BIOLOGICAL PARENT
The law in all states allows at least some adults who are not a child’s
biological parent to become legal parents by adoption, and statutes and case
law in many, but not all, states allow adults who have functioned as a
child’s parent to be treated, at least to some extent, as the child’s legal
parent.11 These devices are available to same-sex functional parents in
some, but not all, states. In the states that do not allow same-sex couples to
use these tools, the need for the voluntary acknowledgment of parentage or
something similar is obvious.
9. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS.,
FY
2009
PRELIMINARY
REPORT
(2010),
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2010/reports/preliminary_report_fy2009.
10. See infra Section IV.
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920 (Del. 2011) (statute permitting a de facto
parent to seek custody does not violate the due process rights of the child’s other legal
parent); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000) (a person who has no
biological relation to a child but who has sufficiently alleged a parent-like relationship
can gain custodial rights to the child).
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However, even where these devices are available, they have serious
limitations. All can be expensive, and all except adoption are available
only if, in hindsight, a court determines that an unrelated adult has become
a functional parent. The latter feature alone means that unrelated adults
who develop relationships with children cannot rely on these devices to
protect those relationships. Exacerbating this problem is that all the
doctrines that allow courts to protect functional parent-child relationships
are indeterminate and discretionary. For all these reasons, same-sex
parents in all states need a legal means of voluntarily establishing parentage
simply and easily.
A. Second-Parent Adoption
Same-sex couples who want to raise a child together, with both being
recognized as legal parents, face an immediate problem under traditional
legal principles.12 The traditional law of parentage, including adoption law,
is premised on the assumption that a child can have at most one parent of
each sex.13 According to this premise, if a child has a living parent, another
adult of the same sex can adopt the child only if the parental rights of the
pre-existing parent are terminated. But, of course, this is exactly what
same-sex couples do not want to do. Instead, they want what is commonly
termed “second parent adoption,” which recognizes the legal status of the
new parent without eliminating the parental status of the original parent.
Statutes and case law in ten jurisdictions explicitly allow second-parent
adoption.14 California, Connecticut, and Vermont have enacted statutes
that authorize second-parent adoption.15 In the absence of statutory
authority, appellate courts in the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania have approved
12. In addition, in at least four states, the law prohibits any gay man or lesbian
from adopting a child, regardless of whether s/he is in a relationship or not. FAMILY
EQUALITY COUNSEL, STATE-BY-STATE: GAY ADOPTION LAWS (2008), available at
http://www.familyequality.org/pdf/aoption_withcitations.pdf. This Article does not
address this problem, nor does it deal with legal bias against gay and lesbian parents in
custody contests with children’s straight parents. For a recent discussion of this issue,
see Kim H. Pearson, Mimetic Reproduction of Sexuality in Child Custody Decisions, 22
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 53 (2010).
13. Justice Scalia made this assumption explicit when he wrote, “California law,
like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood. Michael was seeking to be
declared the father of Victoria.” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1988).
14. See generally Jason C. Beekman, Note, Same-Sex Second-Parent Adoption and
Intestacy Law: Applying the Sharon S. Model of “Simultaneous” Adoption to ParentChild Provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 149 n.69
(2010).
15. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8616.5, 9000 (West Supp. 2010) (allowing only registered
domestic partners to adopt without terminating the legal status of the biological parent
by post-adoption contract); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(a)(3) (West 2009); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002).
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second-parent adoption.16 Second-parent adoptions also occur in states that
have no statutes or appellate cases authorizing them, but the exact number
is disputed. The Family Equality Council lists eleven jurisdictions that
allow second-parent adoptions throughout the entire state (the ten listed
above plus Colorado) while sixteen states allow second-parent adoptions in
a portion of that state (Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia).17 The
Council identifies three states as explicitly disallowing second-parent
adoption (Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin).18 North Carolina must be
added to this since, in 2010, its supreme court interpreted state statutes as
precluding second-parent adoption.19 Thus, an optimistic estimate is that at
most half the states allow second-parent adoption, 20 and even where it is
allowed, same-sex couples must be willing and able to deal with the
unfamiliar demands of the legal system, as well as its expense.
B. De Facto and Psychological Parents
In some states, statutes or case law allow some classes of adults to obtain
parental status through litigation, but these doctrines by no means protect
all adults and children who regard themselves as families. Usually
employing the term “de facto parent,” “psychological parent,” or person
standing “in loco parentis,” these statutes21 and cases22 allow an adult
16. In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 865-66 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of K.M., 653
N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of Infant K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d
1253, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003); In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993); In
re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 540-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of R.B.F.,
803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002); see also Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554,
563 (Cal. 2003); Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (upholding
second-parent adoption in California and Vermont before explicit statutes were
enacted).
17. THE FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, STATE-BY-STATE: SECOND PARENT
ADOPTION
LAWS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.d1083684.domain.com/down/secondparent_withcitations.pdf.
18. Id.
19. See Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 501 (N.C. 2010) (prohibiting second
parent adoption because statutes do not authorize it).
20. See
also
Adoption
and
Parenting,
LAMBDA
LEGAL,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/issues/adoption-and-parenting (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
21. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (West 2011); D.C. CODE § 16831.01(1) (2011); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-17-2-8.5, 31-9-2-35.5 (West 2011); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257C.08(4) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(1) (West
2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7102(a) (2011).
22. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 2004); Smith v. Guest, 16
A.3d 920 (Del. 2011); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); C.E.W. v.
D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000), cert.
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caregiver who is not biologically related to a child to seek custodial or
visitation rights because the adult has formed a functional parent-child
relationship with the child. In some states, the de facto parent is in effect a
legal parent and stands on equal footing with other legal parents.23 In
others, the de facto or psychological parent is not a legal parent, and must
overcome the constitutionally-mandated assumption that the legal parent’s
decisions regarding the child should control.24
denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000); Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 494; Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d
915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005); In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). For discussions of the claims of
lesbian coparents, see generally Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage
Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433 (2005); Polikoff,
supra note 5.
Often the issue arises when a child was conceived by assisted reproduction.
California has the most extensive line of cases on the legal consequences of assisted
reproductive technology. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993);
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (App. 1998). For discussions of
issues relating to parenthood from assisted reproduction, see generally JANET L.
DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN
UNEASY AGE (1997); R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three—or Four, or Five, or Six:
Redefining the Family After the Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 231
(2000); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297 (1990);
Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood By Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002).
23. See, e.g., C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1151 (Me. 2004); V.C., 748 A.2d
at 549; In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 180-81 (Wash. 2005) (en banc); see also
Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931 & n.61 (Del. 2011) (citing cases); infra notes 25-31.
In California, the courts have applied a statute providing that a man who takes a
child into his home and holds himself out as the child’s parent is presumed to be the
parent to lesbian functional parents. The effect is to give the women the status of legal
parents. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117
P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 695-96 (Cal. 2005).
The statute is based on a provision of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) of 1973 that
provides that a man is presumed to be the child’s father if he has taken the child into his
home and held himself out as the father for two years. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(4)
(1973), 9B U.L.A. 393-94 (2001). The 2002 UPA requires that the period of holding
out occur for the first two years of the child’s life and is, therefore, more limited than
the 1973 version. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 22-23
(Supp 2011). A similar provision has been enacted in at least nine states; most do not
impose the two-year time limit. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2011); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 584-4(a)(4) (West 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-7-2 (West 2011); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 6(a)(4) (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55 (1)(d)
(West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(d) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
126.051(1)(d) (West 2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102(b)(2) (West 2011).
Statutes that impose a two-year time limit include DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(b)
(5) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(v) (2011). However, statutes of this
type have not been applied to same-sex couples in any state except California.
24. This requirement is imposed by Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
Among the cases holding that Troxel requires adults who alleged that they have
functioned as parents but who are not legal parents to carry a heavy burden to
overcome parental objections are Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 70 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008); Estroff v. Chatterjee, 660 S.E.2d 73, 75 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Jacob v. ShultzJacob, 923 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); and Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d
494, 496 (Va. Ct. App. 2008). See also In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 153-54 (W.
Va. 2005).
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Litigation in Delaware, culminating in a 2011 decision from the state
supreme court, clearly illustrates this distinction. When Lynn Smith and
Carol Guest broke up in 2004, they began a long legal struggle over
custody of a child who had been adopted by Smith but not Guest.25 In the
first round of the fight, a state trial court held that Guest could petition for
joint legal custody, even though she was not a legal parent under the thenexisting version of the state parentage act, because she was a de facto
parent.26 The state supreme court reversed, holding that a nonparent could
petition for custody only if the child were neglected and allowing the
petition was in the child’s best interests.27 The state legislature then
amended the statutory definition of legal parent to include de facto
parents,28 and Guest refiled under the new statute. Smith responded,
arguing that the statutory amendment was unconstitutional.29 The trial
court rejected this argument, found that Guest was a de facto parent, and
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed,
awarded joint custody.30
concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Troxel did not limit
the authority of a state to define who is a legal parent.31 The effect was that
both women were recognized as legal parents and could both seek custody
of the child. As in other custody disputes between two legal parents, the
case would be decided based on the child’s best interests, a legal standard
that does not automatically favor either parent.
The first limitation of this solution for a functional parent who is denied
access by a child’s legal parent is that not all states accept the de
facto/psychological parent doctrine.32 For example, the New York Court of
Appeals recently affirmed an earlier case that took this position. The court
wrote:
[Allowing a de facto or psychological parent to seek custody or
visitation] threatens to trap single biological and adoptive parents and
their children in a limbo of doubt. These parents could not possibly

25.
26.
27.
28.

Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1 (Del. 2009) (superseded by statute).
Id.
Id. at 15.
S.B. 84, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009) (amending 13 DEL. CODE. §§ 8–201,
2302(13) (West 2011)).
29. Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 924 (Del. 2011).
30. Id. at 925.
31. Id. at 931 (citing In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Britain v. Carvin, 547 U.S. 1143 (2006)); see also id. at 931 n.61
(citing cases from other states as “supporting” decision).
32. See, e.g., Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006);
In re C.B.L. 723 N.E.2d 316, 320-21 (Ill. App. 1999); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27, 32 (N.Y. 1991); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. App. 1999);
Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 812 (Utah 2007); Ticthenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682,
689 (Vt. 1997).
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know for sure when another adult’s level of involvement in family life
might reach the tipping point and jeopardize their right to bring up their
children without the unwanted participation of a third party.
Significantly, ‘the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of
their children[ ] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by’ the United States Supreme Court (Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). Courts must be sensible of ‘the traditional
presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her
child’ and protect the parent’s ‘fundamental constitutional right to make
decisions concerning the rearing of’ that child (id. at 69-70).33

Even where the de facto parent or psychological parent doctrine is
accepted, it has serious limitations. In states that do not treat a de facto or
psychological parent as a legal parent, the doctrine only protects
relationships when a court finds that the legal parent has waived his or her
parental rights by allowing the development of the relationship or that the
legal parent’s failure to allow the relationship to continue is harmful to the
child or both. In all states, the doctrines are triggered only after the adult
and child have been in a relationship for a significant amount of time, and
their application requires highly specific fact-finding. In other words, these
doctrines require that a claimant be able to bear the burden of extensive
litigation, and even then, outcomes are unpredictable.
II. VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS OF PATERNITY FOR UNMARRIED,
OPPOSITE-SEX PARENTS
A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (VAP) is a document signed
by a child’s mother and the putative father that identifies the man as the
father. When the document is filed with the state office of vital statistics, it
establishes legal paternity. The VAP is a creature of federal child support
law, but its use and social impact extend beyond the child support arena.
The federal government provides millions of dollars to states to fund
their child welfare programs, provided that they enact a wide range of
statutes and regulations required by federal laws. The federal funding is so
critical to the functioning of the state programs that all states comply with
these federal mandates, for the most part. The Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) legislation imposes many of these requirements to
facilitate child support enforcement. The most important requirement for
purposes of this Article is that states must authorize VAPs.34 VAPs have
become an exceptionally important way of establishing legal paternity. In
33. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 193, 280 (N.Y. 2010) (parallel citations
omitted) (holding that New York would recognize that a child born in Vermont to a
lesbian couple in a civil union was the legal child of both women as a matter of
comity).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (2006).
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2009, forty-one percent of all births in the United States were to unmarried
women.35 For most of these children, legal paternity was established, most
often by a VAP.36
Federal law imposes additional rules to govern VAPs. States may not
require blood testing as a precondition to signing a VAP.37 The law must
treat a VAP as if it resolves a legal dispute; when a VAP is filed with the
state office of vital statistics, it has the legal effect of a judicial
determination of paternity.38 The state cannot condition the validity of the
acknowledgment on any kind of proceeding.39 States must give full faith
and credit to acknowledgments signed in other states if they contain the
information required by federal standards and have been executed in
compliance with the procedures required by the state in which they were
signed.40
Voluntary acknowledgment forms must be offered to all parents at all
birthing facilities and birth records offices in the state.41 Each party must
be given oral and written notice of the alternatives to, legal consequences
of, and rights and responsibilities arising from the signed
acknowledgment.42
Either party must be able to rescind the
acknowledgment within sixty days of the child’s birth or the date of any
judicial or administrative proceeding relating to the child, whichever occurs
first.43 After that, an acknowledgment can be challenged only on the
ground of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.44
While the federal legislation contemplated that VAPs would be used
simply to establish paternity, usually for the sake of collecting child
35. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 4. In 2009, 72.8 percent of births among
non-Hispanic Black women were to unmarried women, compared to 65.4 percent to
American Indian or Alaska Natives, 53.2 percent to Hispanic women, 29 percent to
non-Hispanic white women, and 17.2 percent to Asian or Pacific Islanders. Id.
36. In 2009, 1,693,000 children were born outside marriage. Id. In the same year,
paternity was established by a VAP for 1,167,000 children. THE OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 9. VAPs are most often signed at or soon after the
time of birth, as discussed in the text infra notes 46-48.
37. 45 C.F.R. 302.70 (a)(5)(vii) (2009); SHERRI Z. HELLER, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., POLICY INTERPRETATION QUESTION 03-01: PATERNITY
DISESTABLISHMENT (2003).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(5)(D)(ii) (2006). The name of a man who is not married to
the mother can appear on a child’s birth certificate only if the voluntary
acknowledgment has been filed or a court or administrative agency has determined that
he is the father. Id. § 666 (a)(5)(D)(i).
39. Id. § 666 (a)(5)(E).
40. Id. § 666 (a)(5)(C)(iv).
41. Id. § 666 (a)(5)(C)(ii).
42. Id. § 666 (a)(5)(C)(i).
43. Id. § 666 (a)(5)(D)(ii).
44. See id. However, Section 666 does not define or address circumstances that
could establish fraud or duress.
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support, empirical evidence indicates that unmarried parents are using
VAPs for another purpose: to identify themselves as a child’s co-parents
and to memorialize that relationship. The most complete, recent evidence
about unmarried parents and their children comes from the Fragile Families
and Child Wellbeing study, a longitudinal study of about 5,000 children
and their parents that is generalizable to all urban areas with a population of
over 200,000.45 Researchers using this data found that at the time of birth,
the great majority of unmarried parents are strongly connected to each
other and to their children, and that they regard themselves as families. At
the time of birth, fifty-one percent of unmarried parents are living together,
and thirty-one percent are dating each other.46 Most of these parents sign
VAP forms soon after birth. The Fragile Families researchers found that in
urban areas, the paternity establishment rate is sixty-nine percent and that
eighty-one percent of the paternity establishments are in the hospital or
birthing center.47 While the paternity establishment rate for couples not
living together is lower, it is still fifty-eight percent, although only fortytwo percent of these establishments occur in the hospital.48
No report from the Fragile Families Study examines the parents’
attitudes toward or use of genetic testing as a precursor to signing a VAP,
but an independent Michigan study found that even when free genetic
testing was offered to anyone who requested it before signing a VAP, only
a tiny fraction asked for the test. Of the 1,660 nonmarital births examined,
a VAP was signed in seventy-eight and a half percent, and only in 112
cases was a genetic test requested.49 Parents who establish paternity by
45. SARA MCLANAHAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE FAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING
STUDY: BASELINE NATIONAL REPORT 1 (2003). The study includes children born in
seventy-five hospitals in twenty cities in the U.S. with populations over 200,000. Id.
The study uses baseline data collected between 1998 and 2000. Id. Mothers and
fathers were interviewed at birth, and follow-up interviews were done when the
children were one, three and five years old.
46. Id. at 8; see also LARRY BUMPASS, L. & HSIEN-HEN LU, TRENDS IN
COHABITATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN’S FAMILY CONTEXTS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2000).
47. Ronald Mincy et al., In-Hospital Paternity Establishment and Father
Involvement in Fragile Families, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 611, 611, 615 (2005).
48. Id. at 615. A smaller Wisconsin study found that almost half of all unmarried
parents in that state in 2005 filed VAPs near the time of their children’s birth. Older
parents were more likely to use VAPs than younger parents, and college-educated
mothers used VAPs at twice the rate of mothers who had not finished high school.
PATRICIA R. BROWN & STEVEN T. COOK, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, UNIV. OF
WIS., A DECADE OF VOLUNTARY PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN WISCONSIN: 19972007 (2008), available at http://www.ssc.eisc.edu/irpweb/research/childsup/scpolicy/
pdfs/T12-VolPat97-07-Report.pdf. Seldom do parents marry and then file a VAP after
the birth of their child; in 2005, the number was less than one percent of all nonmarital
births. Id.
49. Compare OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT, STATE OF MICH., FAMILY INDEPENDENCE
AGENCY, 100% PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT PROGRAM, ONE YEAR PILOT SUMMARY,
available at http://michigan.gov/documents/FIA-Pub-45-Paternity-Establishment-
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signing VAPs, like married parents, generally do not want to challenge the
integrity of their relationships by requesting genetic testing at the time of
birth.50
VAPs were invented to facilitate child support enforcement by
establishing legal paternity; they were not originally intended to allow
unmarried parents to memorialize their relationship as co-parents and to
identify themselves and their child as a family. The Fragile Families Study
reports show, though, that many unmarried parents regard a VAP as having
this significance. For these parents VAPs provide a clear, inexpensive way
to establish a legal parent-child relationship for all purposes between the
man and the child51 and to identify the man and woman as the child’s coparents. Same-sex couples who decide to become parents together need a
mechanism like a VAP, to make their intentions clear and to provide legal
protections to themselves and to their child without unnecessary expense or
delay.
III. SHOULD VAPS BE RESERVED FOR BIOLOGICAL, OPPOSITE-SEX
COUPLES?
In response to my proposal, it might be argued that same-sex couples
Project_339177.pdf (23.2 percent of men tested were excluded as the biological father),
with David Bishai et al., A National Sample of US Paternity Tests: Do Demographics
Predict Test Outcomes?, 46 TRANSFUSION 849, 849 (2006) (in national study, 72
percent probability of men who underwent paternity testing in a child support office
were found to be the child’s biological father). This does not mean, of course, that in
almost a quarter of all cases in which a man is believed to be the biological father of a
child, he is not. Almost always, the man identified as a child’s legal father is the
biological father.
Nearly All Paternity Tests Back Dad’s Biological Claim,
HEALTHDAY (Apr. 17, 2006) (citing Kermyt G. Anderson, How Well Does Paternity
Confidence Match Actual Paternity? Results from Worldwide Nonpaternity Rates, 48
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 513, 515 (2006)) (noting that in the U.S., ninety-eight
percent of men raising children they believe to be their biological children are correct,
and only thirty percent of men who seek blood tests to confirm paternity are not the
biological father).
50. Notwithstanding the evidence about people’s wishes, a number of
commentators have argued that genetic testing be required before legal parenthood is
established. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the
Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1011, 1067 (2003); Niccol D. Kording, Little White Lies that Destroy Children’s
Lives–Recreating Paternity Fraud Laws to Protect Children’s Interests, 6 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 237, 239 (2004); Anne Greenwood, Comment, Predatory Paternity
Establishment: A Critical Analysis of the Acknowledgment of Paternity Process in
Texas, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 421, 451 (2004); cf. Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology and
Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 266
(2006) (rejecting mandatory paternity testing for married mothers as inconsistent with
the policy of promoting marriage).
51. At common law, an unmarried father often had the duty to support a child
without having any custodial rights. Today, however, ordinarily legal parenthood is a
package that includes both child support duties and custodial rights. Leslie Joan Harris,
The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody and Child Support, 42
IND. L. REV. 611, 618 (2009).
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with a child are inherently unlike opposite-sex couples because both cannot
be the biological parent of the child (setting aside those lesbian couples in
which one woman is the genetic mother and the other the gestational
mother). Instead, they are like opposite-sex couples in which one partner
has a child from another relationship; in this situation, the partner who is
not the legal parent is a stepparent, a figure sharply distinct from a legal
parent with few legal rights and duties.52 For a stepparent to become a
legal parent, he or she must adopt the child. Those who believe that samesex partnerships are more like relationships between legal and stepparents
would, therefore, conclude that “second parents” in same-sex relationships
should also be required to adopt if they want to become legal parents.
A couple of unstated assumptions underlie this argument: first, that
VAPs are reserved for biological parents, so that that a man who is not the
child’s biological father cannot validly execute a VAP; and second, that
unmarried same-sex partners cannot be similarly situated to unmarried
opposite-sex partners for purposes of their legal relationship to children
born to the couple. This section analyzes both assumptions.
A. Is Biological Paternity a Prerequisite for a Valid VAP?
Federal statutes that require states to establish VAPs do not provide that
the man signing a VAP must aver that he is the child’s biological father.53
As discussed above, federal law requires that a VAP must become final
sixty days after it is filed unless a challenger can prove that it was obtained
by fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.54 The most common
challenge to a VAP after the sixty-day rescission period is that the woman
committed fraud by misleading the man about his biological paternity or
that there is a material mistake of fact because the man is not the biological
father.
Federal law does not define fraud or mistake of fact, but it does provide
that a VAP must have the legal effect of a final judgment.55 If a VAP were
truly to be treated like a judgment, the success of such a challenge would
turn on whether the man had exercised due diligence in attempting to
52. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the StepparentChild Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 40 (1984) (discussing the limited legal
rights available to stepparents).
53. The Uniform Parentage Act, which was intended to comply with federal law, is
ambivalent. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 26-27
(Supp. 2011) (for voluntary acknowledgment to be valid, the man must be the
biological father), with id. § 308(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 317 (2001), and id. §
609(b) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2011) (providing that challenges to
voluntary acknowledgments based on duress, fraud or material mistake of fact must be
brought within two years of when acknowledgment was filed).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(5)(D)(iii) (2006).
55. Id. § 666 (a)(5)(D)(ii).
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discover the truth before signing the VAP.56 Given the ready availability of
genetic testing, this would be a difficult hurdle to overcome.57
However, of the states that have decided the issue, most allow challenges
to VAPs based on genetic tests showing that the man is not the biological
father. In at least sixteen states, statutes explicitly allow a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity to be set aside after the sixty-day rescission
period when genetic testing shows that the man is not the biological
father.58 In at least six of these states, the statute also requires the court to
consider whether the challenger is estopped to deny paternity, whether
vacating the VAP would be inconsistent with the child’s best interests, or
both.59
In states whose statutes do not explicitly address whether genetic testing
is sufficient to justify setting aside a VAP, the case law is mixed. Case law
in at least six states allows courts to set aside voluntary acknowledgments
after the rescission period in some situations, based on genetic testing,
either without requiring proof of fraud, duress or mistake or by liberally
construing those terms so that they can be satisfied by little more than proof
that the man is not the biological father.60 However, eight states have held
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70(2) (1982).
57. The UPA is, again, ambiguous. It gives the court authority to block a challenge

to the marital presumption or to a paternity judgment based on a finding that the party
bringing the challenge is estopped to deny paternity and that it would be inequitable to
disprove the father-child relationship. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 608(a) (amended
2002), 9B U.L.A. 53-54 (Supp. 2011). Those provisions require that challenges to
paternity based on the marital presumption and the presumption arising from holding
be based on genetic test evidence, and only court-ordered tests are admissible unless all
parties agree to the admission of other test results. Id. § 309(d) (amended 2002), 9B
U.L.A. 318 (2001). The provisions governing adjudications of paternity apply to
actions challenging voluntary acknowledgments. Id. § 621(c)(2) (amended 2002), 9B
U.L.A. 346 (2001). The court’s analysis must take into account the child’s age, the
child’s relationships to the husband and the man alleged to be the genetic father, and
the facts surrounding the husband’s discovery of his possible nonpaternity. Id. §
608(b) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 53-54 (Supp. 2011). These provisions seem to
assume that the challenge would at least be founded on evidence that the man is not the
biological father, but as a whole, they clearly mean that not all challenges will be
allowed.
58. ALA. CODE § 26-17-308(a)(2) (2011); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7575(b) (West 2011);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107.3(1) (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b172(a)(2) (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.18(1)(b) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-7-54(a)(2) (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600B.41A(3)(f)(2) (West 2011); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.025(3) (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 51038(a)(2)(i)(2) (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1011(2) (West 2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.62(1) (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-9-9(4)(c)–(d), 939-28(2)(c)–(d) (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.854(2) (West 2011); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 109.070(6) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-307(5) (West
2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.10 (2011).
59. ALA. CODE § 26-17-608(a); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(2)(c); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-15-608.
60. See State ex rel. Sec’y Soc. & Rehab Serv. v. Kimbrel, 231 P.3d 576, 582
(Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (allowing the rebuttal of the presumption of paternity if a man
who has signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity can establish by clear and
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that a VAP should not be vacated, despite evidence that the man was not
the biological father. 61 The cases in these states do not say that biology is
irrelevant but rather require evidence beyond the genetic test to prove fraud
or mistake,62 or they provide that a VAP may not be set aside if the
convincing evidence that he is not the biological father); Rousseve v. Jones, 704 So. 2d
229, 232-33 (La. 1997) (voluntary acknowledgment of paternity is based on the belief
that the man is the biological father and, if genetic testing shows this statement to be
false, the acknowledgment is nullified); see also Dep’t Human Serv. v. Chisum, 85
P.3d 860, 862-63 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (permitting the rebuttal of the presumption of
paternity when plaintiff’s voluntary acknowledgment of parentage was based on
mistake of fact); Glover v. Severino, 946 A.2d 710, 717-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)
(permitting the rebuttal of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity when a mother
misled the plaintiff to believe he was the biological father); R.W.E. v. A.B.K., 961
A.2d 161, 166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (duress, fraud, or mistake of fact can be shown by
genetic testing); Jones v. State ex rel. Coleman, No. W2006-00540-COA-R3-JV, 2006
WL 3613612, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2006) (ordering DNA testing after
holding that fraud was found when the mother of the child failed to inform the plaintiff
that she had an affair and participated in activities that could cause her to be pregnant
by another man); State ex rel. Dancy v. King, No. W2010-00934-COA-R3-JV, 2011
WL 1235597, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011) (evidence warranted a paternity test
more than five years after the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity was signed);
State ex rel. W. Va. Dep’t Health & Human Res., 531 S.E.2d 669, 676-77 (W. Va.
2000) (proof by clear and convincing evidence of fraud, duress, material mistake of
fact, or similar circumstance is necessary for a court to entertain a challenge to the
validity of acknowledgment).
61. See In re Parentage of G.E.M., 890 N.E.2d 944, 964 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (trial
court had no subject matter jurisdiction to “revisit or re-determine the existence of a
father and child relationship for a child who already had a legal father”); A.E. v. J.E.,
No. 69A01-0901-CV-31, 2009 WL 1562993, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. June 4, 2009)
(voluntary paternity acknowledgment cannot be challenged after the statutory time
period unless duress, fraud, or misrepresentation of fact is established); In re Paternity
of H.H., 879 N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (forbidding a challenge to a
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity after the statutory time limit); In re Paternity of
E.M.L.G., 863 N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to file for genetic testing
within the sixty-day time limit provided under state law precludes a man from
challenging the voluntary acknowledgment of parentage after the deadline); In re
Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 500 (Mass. 2001) (statute of limitations); Ex rel
Melissa B. v. Robert W.R., 803 N.Y.S.2d 672, 679 (App. Div. 2005) (defendant not
entitled to genetic testing unless he can prove fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact); In re Support Obligation of Do Rego, 620 N.W.2d 770, 771 (S.D. 2001) (genetic
evidence cannot rebut the presumption of legitimacy unless it is either within the sixtyday statute of limitations or in cases of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact); DNW
v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 154 P.3d 990, 994 (Wyo. 2007) (legislature intended
to make paternity finding final as stated in statutory affidavit); see also Andrew R. v.
Ariz. Dep’t Econ. Sec., 224 P.3d 950, 959 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (applying limitations
period in rule of civil procedure governing challenges to judgments); In re Williams v.
Carlson, 701 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (enforcing the sixty-day time
limit to rebut the presumption of parentage once the voluntary acknowledgment of
parentage is filed); In re Gendron, 950 A.2d 151, 156 (N.H. 2008) (refusing to set aside
a VAP from Massachusetts because the genetic testing was not contested within the
Massachusetts statute of limitations); In re Elliott, No. 12-10-02, 2010 WL 4471277, at
*5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2010) (“[O]nce the timeframe for filing a rescission action
has lapsed, the man who signed the affidavit of paternity is deemed to be the child’s
father.”).
62. See Parentage of G.E.M., 890 N.E.2d at 955-56 (refusing “to allow a man . . .
to undo his voluntary acknowledgment years later on the basis of DNA results, when
his paternity was based . . . on the conscious decision to accept the legal responsibility
of being the child’s father”); Paternity of H.H., 879 N.E.2d at 1178 (holding that the

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012

15

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 4

482

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:3

evidence shows that to do so would be contrary to the child’s best
interests63 or that the petitioner is estopped from challenging the VAP.64
Further, it should be noted that even in states that allow a VAP to be set
aside upon proof that the man is not the child’s biological father, a man
who is not the biological father can still sign a VAP, since genetic testing
cannot be required. If paternity is never challenged, he remains the child’s
legal father.
B. Equal Protection Requires That Same-Sex Couples Have Access to VAPs
or Their Equivalent
Unmarried same-sex partners who wish to establish legal parenthood
between children and the partner who is not the biological parent have two
equal protection arguments to support the claim that VAPs should be
available to them. The first argument, available only to women, is that
allowing men to establish paternity but not allowing women to establish
maternity constitutes prohibited gender-based discrimination. The second
argument, available to all same-sex couples, is that denying them access to
VAPs amounts to unconstitutional discrimination based on sexual
orientation. A challenge claiming that denying women access to VAPs
amounts to gender discrimination should receive heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause,65 and at least under some state constitutions, a
challenge based on sexual orientation discrimination will also warrant

trial court erred in allowing mother to challenge a voluntary acknowledgment by
demanding genetic testing after the statute of limitations had expired); Demetrius H.,
827 N.Y.S.2d 810, 810 (2006) (party must show fraud, duress or material mistake of
fact before the court is required to order a DNA test); DNW, 154 P.3d at 994 .
63. Kimbrel, 231 P.3d at 582 (genetic testing was appropriate because it was in the
best interests of the child); Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d at 495 (“Where a father
challenges a paternity judgment [the] consideration of what is in a child’s best interests
will often weigh more heavily than the genetic link between parent and child.”); In re
J.B. & J.G., 953 A.2d 1186, 1190 (N.H. 2008) (awarding standing to a petitioner
because it is in the best interest of the child).
64. See J.E., 2009 WL 1562993, at *4 (“[W]here the party seeking to rescind a
paternity affidavit is a man who falsely attested to a belief that he was the child’s
biological father, he is collaterally estopped from challenging the affidavit’s validity.”);
Melissa B., 803 N.Y.S.2d at 678 (“[E]quitable estoppel may be invoked to preclude a
father . . . from denying paternity to avoid support obligations where the invocation of
the doctrine is in the best interests of the child.”) (internal citations omitted); State ex
rel Wernke v. Cortez, 783 N.W.2d 852, 854 (S.D. 2010) (recognizing that statute of
limitations bars challenge to voluntary acknowledgment); Do Rego, 620 N.W.2d at
771-72 (estopping the mother from challenging the presumption that her ex-husband
was the father of her child and attempting to obtain child support for over ten years
from her past lover).
65. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”); see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (discussing Boren).
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heightened scrutiny.66
The first issue when either equal protection claim is made would be
whether the group that cannot use VAPs is similarly situated to the group
that can use them. For purposes of the challenge raised by women, the
question is whether women are similarly situated to men for purposes of
access to the VAP to establish parentage. In Caban v. Mohammed, the
Supreme Court rejected essentialist claims that mothers and fathers are
inherently different for purposes of parental rights.67 This supports the
conclusion that men and women are similarly situated for purposes of a
VAP process that does not presuppose a biological relationship between the
child and both adults. In Caban, the Court said:
Contrary to appellees’ argument . . . maternal and paternal roles are not
invariably different in importance. Even if unwed mothers as a class
were closer than unwed fathers to their newborn infants, this
generalization concerning parent-child relations would become less
acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child
increased. The present case demonstrates that an unwed father may have
a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the mother.
Appellant Caban, appellee Maria Mohammed, and their two children
lived together as a natural family for several years. As members of this
family, both mother and father participated in the care and support of
their children. There is no reason to believe that the Caban children—
aged 4 and 6 at the time of the adoption proceedings—had a relationship
with their mother unrivaled by the affection and concern of their father.
We reject, therefore, the claim that the broad, gender-based distinction of
[the challenged statute] is required by any universal difference between
maternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child’s
development.68

At least one state court, the Oregon Court of Appeals, has decided a case
turning on a claim of sexual-orientation discrimination very similar to that
posited here. Earlier Oregon cases had held that granting a benefit only to
married couples discriminated against same-sex couples on the basis of
their sexual orientation in violation of the state constitution.69 In 2009, the
66. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431-32 (Conn. 2008)
(sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect class); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896
(Iowa 2009) (“[L]egislative classifications based on sexual orientation must be
examined under a heightened level of scrutiny.”); Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40
(Or. Ct. App. 2009) (classification based on sexual orientation requires heightened
scrutiny); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008) (strict scrutiny
applies to statutes that impose differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation).
67. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 388.
68. Id. at 389.
69. Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)
(concluding that denial of health insurance dependent’s benefits to the domestic partner
of a state employee in a same-sex relationship violated Art. 1, Sec. 20 of the state
constitution). As is still true today, at the time Tanner was decided, same-sex couples
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court applied this principle in Shineovich v. Kemp70 to hold that a state
statute governing the parentage of children conceived by artificial
insemination must be interpreted to establish legal maternity in the lesbian
partner of a child’s biological mother. The statute as enacted provides that
the husband of a woman who conceives a child by artificial insemination is
the legal father. Concluding that the statute must be interpreted to apply
when a same-sex couple conceives a child by artificial insemination,71 the
Shineovich court said:
We can see no justification for denying that privilege on the basis of
sexual orientation, particularly given that same-sex couples may become
legal coparents by other means – namely adoption. There appears to be
no reason for permitting heterosexual couples to bypass adoption
proceedings by conceiving a child through mutually consensual artificial
insemination, but not permitting same-sex couples to do so.72
could not marry in Oregon.
70. 214 P.3d at 29.
71. Id. at 40.
72. Id.; see also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883-84 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that marriage must be
available to same-sex couples and that, for purposes of marriage, same-and oppositesex couples are similarly situated). The court in Varnum, reasoned:
Plaintiffs are in committed and loving relationships, many raising families, just
like heterosexual couples. Moreover, official recognition of their status
provides an institutional basis for defining their fundamental relationship rights
and responsibilities, just as it does for heterosexual couples. Society benefits,
for example, from providing same-sex couples a stable framework within
which to raise their children . . . just as it does when that framework is
provided for opposite-sex couples. . . . In short, for purposes of Iowa’s
marriage laws, which are designed to bring a sense of order to the legal
relationships of committed couples and their families in myriad ways,
plaintiffs are similarly situated in every important respect, but for their sexual
orientation.
763 N.W.2d at 884. Similarly, the court in Kerrigan, wrote:
With respect to their first claim, the defendants assert that the plaintiffs are not
similarly situated to opposite sex couples, thereby obviating the need for this
court to engage in an equal protection analysis, “because the conduct that they
seek to engage in—marrying someone of the same sex—is fundamentally
different from the conduct in which opposite sex couples seek to engage.” We
disagree. It is true, of course, that the plaintiffs differ from persons who
choose to marry a person of the opposite sex insofar as each of the plaintiffs
seeks to marry a person of the same sex. Otherwise, however, the plaintiffs
can meet the same statutory eligibility requirements applicable to persons who
seek to marry, including restrictions related to public safety, such as age . . . .
The plaintiffs also share the same interest in a committed and loving
relationship as heterosexual persons who wish to marry, and they share the
same interest in having a family and raising their children in a loving and
supportive environment. Indeed, the legislature itself recognized the overriding
similarities between same sex and opposite sex couples when, upon passage of
the civil union law, it granted same sex couples the same legal rights that
married couples enjoy. We therefore agree with the California Supreme Court
and conclude that the defendants’ contention that same sex and opposite sex
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At the time the Oregon Court of Appeals decided Shineovich, the Oregon
legislature had enacted a comprehensive domestic partnership act for samesex couples that grants all the rights of marriage available under state law.73
However, the statute did not protect the plaintiff in Shineovich because the
children that her partner bore were conceived before the domestic
partnership act was enacted. Some language in Shineovich suggests that
enactment of the domestic partnership statute cures the problem created by
the artificial insemination statute, since same-sex couples can now become
domestic partners and gain the protection of the statute.74 Even if this
argument is correct, so that the artificial insemination statute does not have
to be extended to same-sex couples, my argument that same-sex couples
should have access to something like a VAP still remains. The parentage
presumption now establishes the paternity of the husband of a married
woman who gives birth during the marriage, and it establishes the
parentage of the domestic partner of a biological parent when a child is
born during the partnership. But opposite-sex couples do not have to marry
(or participate in a filiation suit) to become the legal parents of a child;
instead, they can sign and file a VAP. Under Shineovich, same-sex couples
must have the same opportunity.
However, another portion of the Shineovich decision raises a problem for
this analysis. The plaintiff also argued that the statute providing
establishing the marital presumption of paternity75 would violate the state
constitution if the marital presumption were not extended to same-sex
couples.76 The court of appeals rejected this argument on the basis that the
marital presumption concerns biological paternity. The court said, “By the
very terms of the statue, for the presumption of parentage to apply, it must
be at least possible that the person is the biological parent of the child.”77
couples are not similarly situated clearly lacks merit. “[B]oth [same sex and
opposite sex couples] consist of pairs of individuals who wish to enter into a
formal, legally binding and officially recognized, long-term family relationship
that affords the same rights and privileges and imposes the same obligations
and responsibilities. Under these circumstances, there is no question but that
these two categories of individuals are sufficiently similar to bring into play
equal protection principles that require a court to determine whether
distinctions between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.”
957 A.2d at 423-34 (internal citations omitted).
73. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.300-106.340 (West 2011); see id. § 106.305 (describing
the goal of the legislation as extending the “benefits, protections and responsibilities to
committed same-sex partners and their children that are comparable to those provided
to married individuals and their children”).
74. See Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 40.
75. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070(1).
76. At the time the children in this case were born, the women not only could not
marry but also could not otherwise formalize their relationship, since the domestic
partnership statute had not been enacted, as noted above.
77. Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 36.
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This same argument might be made about the VAP; that it is intended to be
used only to make a child’s biological father the legal father.
This argument directly and explicitly raises the question of whether a
statute that denies a benefit on the basis of a preference for biological
parenthood is constitutional, at least when its effect is to deny same-sex
couples access to a benefit available to opposite-sex couples. It may be
possible to avoid this argument in Oregon and other states with domestic
partnership and civil union laws that extend the marital presumption of
parentage to same-sex couples who have become formal partners. In these
states, the presumption does not necessarily purport to establish only
biological parents as legal parents, since lack of biological parentage
cannot be used to rebut the presumption when it is invoked in a same-sex
relationship.78 Even in states without domestic partnership or civil union
statutes, it may be argued that the VAP is not necessarily about biological
paternity, at least if proof of lack of biological paternity does not create a
per se basis for invalidating the VAP.79
What, though, of states that do invalidate VAPs when lack of biological
paternity is proven? Same-sex couples still might argue that denying them
access to an equivalent means of establishing legal parentage without
marrying (or entering a domestic partnership or civil union) is
unconstitutional for the same reason that the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that the state goal of privileging procreation that occurs
within marriage is invalid. The court in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health said:
The ‘marriage is procreation’ argument singles out the one unbridgeable
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms
that difference into the essence of legal marriage. Like ‘Amendment 2’
to the Constitution of Colorado, which effectively denied homosexual
persons equality under the law and full access to the political process, the
marriage restriction impermissibly ‘identifies persons by a single trait
and then denies them protection across the board.’ Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 633 (1996) . . . . In so doing, the State’s action confers an
official stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex
relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex
relationships and are not worthy of respect.80

78. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 238 (2006) (providing
that if the marital presumption applies to a same-sex couple, it cannot be rebutted proof
of no biological relationship with the child).
79. See supra Part III.A.
80. 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003).
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IV. VAPS FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
While I have argued that unmarried same-sex couples may successfully
argue that they are constitutionally entitled to use existing VAP statutes to
establish legal parentage for the partner who is not the biological parent of
a child born in the relationship, I think a better course is for states to enact
statutes based on the VAP that are adapted to the particular circumstances
of same-sex couples. This section sketches the major ways in which such a
statutory scheme would be different from the standard statutes governing
VAPs today.
The process for establishing parentage by means of a VAP should
remain unchanged in many ways. The law should still require full
disclosure to the adults of the legal consequences of signing and filing the
VAP, no prerequisite or ratification requirement should be imposed, and
filing with the state bureau of vital statistics should be sufficient to
establish legal parenthood in both adults. Either party should be able to
rescind the VAP for a fixed period, and after that, the VAP should become
final and have the effect of a legal judgment.
In addition, if the child’s other biological parent, that is, the parent who
is not part of the same-sex couple intending to become parents, is known,
he or she should have to sign a document relinquishing parental status
before or simultaneous with the signing of the VAP.81 This rule upholds
the principle that a child has at most two legal parents at one time. A VAP
signed in violation of this rule would be voidable if the biological parent,
who was not a party to the VAP, challenged it. However, consistent with
the rules regarding dissolution proposed below, neither of the same-sex
partners who signed the VAP would be able to challenge the VAP on this
basis, regardless of whether he or she knew the identity of the other
biological parent.
After the rescission period, I propose that the parties should be able to
rescind the VAP by mutual agreement. The only nonmutual basis for
vacating a VAP should be proof that continuing the parent-child
relationship would seriously harm the child. Because this proposal makes
it quite difficult to set aside a VAP after the rescission period, I recommend
that the period be longer, perhaps six months, to give the parents time to
reflect after the rosy glow accompanying signing the VAP has faded.
Opening VAPs to same-sex couples, either by interpreting existing
statutes so that they apply or by enacting new statutes, recognizes that
81. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 302(a)(3)(A) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A.
314-15 (2001), with §§ 304-05 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 315-16 (2001) (allowing a
married woman, her husband, and another man to execute a document in which all
agree that the husband is not the father of a child born during the marriage and that
instead the other man is).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012

21

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 4

488

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:3

many of these couples are raising children together and that the children
will be better protected if their relationship to their parents can be formally
recognized from the time the children are born. In this sense, my argument
is similar to arguments accepted by a number of courts in granting access to
marriage, or at least the state law benefits of marriage to same-sex
couples.82
However, the law should not limit this protection to children of same-sex
couples who marry or enter civil unions or domestic partnerships. Just as
the law recognizes that all children of opposite-sex couples need to be able
to have a legal relationship to their fathers as well as their mothers, it
should recognize that children of same-sex couples have the same need.
Failure to allow unmarried same-sex couples a means of voluntarily
establishing the legal parenthood of both partners discriminates against
their children on the basis of marriage, as did the traditional law of
illegitimacy. The Supreme Court has largely mandated the dismantling of
this discriminatory regime for children born to opposite-sex couples and
recognizes that the law should treat children born out of wedlock like
children born to married parents except in unusual circumstances.83
Children born to unmarried parents of the same-sex deserve no less.

82. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 3.
83. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a

statute that denied the right to inherit to a nonmarital child, even though paternity had
been established during the father’s lifetime); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (declaring a statute that denied all unmarried fathers parental rights
unconstitutional). At common law, nonmarital children had no inheritance rights.
Harry Krause, ILLEGITIMACY; LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 105-06 (1971). Unmarried
fathers had no custodial rights even if the mothers were unavailable. WALTER C.
TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 114 (1921).
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